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April 28, 1983
TO:

THE LAW CLERKS

FROM:

LFP, JR.

Subject:

Another Capital Case Potential Crisis

I

have

just

received

a

telephone

call

u.s.

from

District Judge Eugene Spellman of Florida (Tel: Nos. 306350-5596

and

5595),

who

has

pending

before

him

an

application for a stay of an execution scheduled for early
Tuesday A.M. May 3.
This
Spellman
another

stay
has
one

application
held

for

was

filed

a

preliminary

9:30

Saturday

yesterday,

hearing
morning,

and

Judge

has

set

primarily

to

consider arguments as to exhaustion of State remedies.
Judge
relied

Spellman

upon

Washington

understands

before
v.

him

Strickland

is

an

that

the

issue

involving

primary

in

the

alleged

issue

case

of

ineffective

assistance of counsel.
Judge

Spellman

thought

that

this

some sort of stay order in Strickland.

Court

had

issued

Mark has checked

with the Clerk's Office, and is advised that no stay has
been issued here though possibly one has been issued by
CAll.

Nor have we acted on the cert petition.

It probably

will come up sometime in May.
I

have asked Ginny to open and maintain a

this.

L. F. P. , JR.

LFP/vde

file on

men

04/28/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark

.......

Re:

Strickland v. Washington, No. 82-1554.
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The State of Florida's petition in this case seeks review of
CAll's

[former CAS Unit B]

ruling on the standard of review in

cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
CAll expressly rejected the ineffective assistance standard
followed

by

the

Florida Supreme Court.

The Florida court had

adopted the rule in United States v. Decoster, 624 F. 2d 196, 208
(1979)

(en bane), that "the accused must bear the initial burden

of demonstrating a likelihood that counsel's inadequacy affected
the
'-.._....,-

outcome

of

the

trial."

CAll

rejected

the

"outcome-

determinative" test of Decoster, holding that the petitioner has
to show only that the ineffective assistance worked to his "actual and substantial disadvantage."
is

followed

in most courts,

App. A70-A73.
and for

(The Decoster

that reason 3 5 States

have filed an amicus brief asking the Court to grant cert.)
For
issue

your

raised

required

purposes
in

here,

this petition

to demonstrate

the

important

is what

point

is

that

3 s-

.4~
the

showing of prejudice is

ineffective assistance of counsel.

The

hother issue discussed in CAll's Washington opinion -- the duty of
~

~

............

counsel to investigate possible witnesses for use at the sentencing hearing -- is not presented for review.
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WASHINGTON, David

1.

SUMMARY:

8 ?)

Federal/Civil (Habeas)

-----

5

Timely

This case concerns the proper standards for

evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based
upon allegations of inadequate preparation for sentencing.

e<'

A

1vance, Godbold, Kravitch, Henderson; Tjoflat; Clark
concurring; Johnson, Anderson concurring in part and dissenting
in part; Roney, Hill, Fay dissenting.

-2-

principal issue is the standard of prejudice required upon a
finding of ineffective assistance.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS:

During a ten-day period in Sept.

·
·
· 1 u d 1ng
·
vt h ree b ruta 1
1976 , resp comm1· tt e d a ser1es
o f cr1mes
1nc

murders.

First, resp stabbed to death a minister.

Three days

later, respondent shot and stabbed three elderly women, killing
one.

Finally, resp kidnapped a college student and, after an

attempt to extort ransom money from his family failed, resp
stabbed him to death.

"Each of these criminal episodes involved

a substantial degree of preparation and each included acts of
theft."

(Page AS).

County police

Several days later, resp surrendered to Dade

and~nfessed

indicted resp and appointed
as his attorney.

to the last murder.

an~perienced

The state

criminal lawyer to act

On Nov. 5, resp, acting against the advice of

counsel, ~onfessed to the two earlier murders.

At trial resp

waived his right to a jury and, again acting against the advice
of his attorney, pleaded guilty to all charges.

Resp. also

waived his right to have a sentencing jury. At the sentencing
hearing, his attorney argued that resp's evident remorse and
willingness to face the consequences of his actions should lead
the court to impose life imprisonment rather than death.

He

incorporated an earlier statement by resp denying a significant
prior criminal record and claim that he had acted under extreme
stress.

~unsel

did not introduce further mitigating evidence,

but was successful in excluding resp's "rap sheet" from evidence.
The judge found, however, that even if resp had no

-3-

significant prior criminal record, the aggravating circumstances
clearly outweighed the factors in mitigation, and accordingly he
sentenced resp to death for each of the three murders.
sentences were upheld on direct appeal.
So.2d 658 (Fla. 1978),

~t.

denied 441

The death

Washington v. State, 362

u.s.

937 (1979).

In March 1980 resp, represented by different counsel, moved
~

'

~-----------

for post-conviction relief in state court alleging that trial
counsel's failure to investigate fully and develop mitigating
evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Florida courts denied resp relief.

The

Washington v. State 397

So •• 2d 258, 287 (Fla. 1981).
Having exhausted his state remedies, resp sought federal
habeas corpus relief, again attacking trial counsel's preparation
for the sentencing phase of his trial.

~

At a DC hearing, trial

counsel testified that he experienced a feeling of "hopelessness"
regarding the case after resp confessed to the latter two
murders, and sought to convince the judge of resp's sincerity and
frankness in pleading guilty.

~unsel

acknowledged that he had

made little attempt to develop evidence of resp's emotional
distress and did not request a presentence report or a
psychiatric investigation because he anticipated that they might
reveal information more harmful than helpful to his client.

The

state called the vtrial judge as a witness who, over the strenuous
~

objection of resp's counsel, testified that evidence of the type
contained in the resp's

affi ~ davits

and psychiatric reports

would not have altered his decision that resp deserved the death
penalty.

The District Court found that trial counsel had made an

-4-

error in judgment but, finding no prejudice, denied relief.

-

A panel of CAS reversed, and Unit B, now CA 11, chose to
reconsider the case en bane. A majority of the court held that
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of

effective assistance of counsel

requires "counsel reasonably likely to render reasonably
effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances."
An effective counsel must conduct a reasonable amount of pretrial
investigation.

V""

The court then identified five guidelines for assessing
whether investigation was constitutionally inadequate.

(1)

When

counsel fails to conduct a substantial investigation into the one
plausible line of defense in the case, there is a clear breach of
the duty to investigate.

(2)

When there is only one line of

defense, counsel is obligated to make a reasonable, though not
necessarily exhaustive investigation.

(3)

If an attorney makes

a strategic choice to rely upon one line of defense rather than
another, and that choice is based upon the exercise of
professional judgement after a reasonably substantial
investigation into all plausible lines of defense, the courts
will find counsel ineffective only if the choice was so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it.
(Page A37-A38)

(4) An attorney who makes a strategic choice to

channel his investigation into fewer than all plausible lines of
defense is effective so long as the assumptions upon which he
bases his strategy are reasonable and his choices on the basis of
those assumptions are reasonable.

Whereas a strategy chosen

after full investigation is entitled to almost automatic approval

-5-

by the courts, a strategy chosen after partial investigation must
be strutinized more closely in order to safeguard the rights of
the criminal defendant.

(Page A41).

(5) When an attorney fails

to conduct a substantial investigation into any of the plausible
lines of defense, the attorney has failed to render effective
assistance of counsel.

The attorney equally fails to render

effective assistance when he chooses among several plausible
lines of defense, thereby excluding certain of them, for no
strategic reason.
The court next turned its attention to the showing of

The ~

prejudice required.

bane court held that a

a & the burden of
assistan

ted not onl

ossibilit

[it] worked to his actual and substantial disadvanta e."
United States v. Frady, 456

u.s. ___, ___

(1982).

If defendant

successfully satisfies this burden, the writ must be granted
unless
_______, the State proves that counsel's ineffectiveness was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In reaching these

conclusions, the court rejected a rule of per se prejudice, as
well as a rule requiring the state to prove harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The court also re j ected the test adop ted by

the purality op1n1on in United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196,
208, 211-212 (CADC), cert. denied, 444

u.s.

944 (1979), that petr

must prove a likelihood that adequate counsel would affect the
outcome of the trial.

Finally the court rejected the panel

majority's requirement that a habeas petr show that "but for his
counsel's ineffectiveness his trial, but not necessarily its

~

-6-

Otltcome, would have been altered in a way helpful to him," 673
F.2d at 902, as setting too low a threshold.
~

Applying these principles to the instant case, the en bane
majority concluded that the District Court erred in three
the court improperly held that trial counsel

respects.

was obligated to investigate substantially a line of defense
based upon emotional distress irrespective of whether trial
strategy made that investigation necessary ~ the DC erred
in applying the DeCoster test to determine that resp failed to
sustain his burden of showing prejudice

reachin~ it~~~·
DC erred 1n ~

, in

decision that resp did not suffer prejudice, the
considering testimony from the trial judge.

It is firmly

established that a judge may not be asked to testify about his
mental processes· in reaching a judicial decision.
v. Ritch, 195

u.s.

276, 306-30 (1904).

~

Fayerweather

Although the court did

not fully agree on the DC's task, see n. 2, infra, the case was
remanded to the DC to make findings on these issues.
--------~--~------------------------A number of separate opinions were filed. 2

2Judge Tjoflat joined in part by Judge Clark, proposed a
different prejudice test: "whether the mitigating evidence
counsel failed to produce would have substantially or materially
affected the decision making process of a rational sentencer."
Judge Johnson, joined by Judge Anderson, concurred in the
substantive portions of Judge Vance's opinion, but believed
ineffective assistance and prejudice was clear from the record
and that a remand was only needed to permit the state to attempt
to rebut the showing of prejudice.
Judge Roney, joined by Judge Fay and Judge Hill dissented.
In their view, counsel's "effectiveness" cannot be considered
without understanding that ~uil t_ in this case was undisputed and
that the facts clearly just1fied l mposition of the death penalty.
TherefOre-cDunsel fiaa to approach the case as one where mercy,
Footnote continued on next page.

-7-

3.

CONTENTIONS:

Florida contends that all the reasons for

cert set forth in Rule 17 are present here.
The ineffective assistance of counsel question is one of the
most important issues in the criminal justice field.

The en bane

court's rejection of the requirement that ineffective assistance
must have been likely to affect the outcome of the case creates a
direct conflict with the en bane opinion of CADC in DeCoster,
supra, and the Fla. Sup. Ct.'s decision in Knight v. State, 394
So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981), which follows DeCoster. Subsequently, in
Armstrong v. State, ___ So.2d ___ , (Fla. 1983) the Fla. Sup. Ct.
expressly recognized the present en bane opinion but declined to
follow it, reaffirming its view that Knight is correct. In
addition, there is widespread conflict among the federal circuits
and state courts on the issue.

Decisions in CAl, CA2, CAS, CA7,

CAS and CA9 follow the DeCoster and Knight standard now rejected
by CAll.

On the other hand CA3, CA4, CA6 and CAlO have either

presumed prejudice after an initial showing of ineffective
counsel or have not required any showing of prejudice by a
defendant.

In addition, at least 20 states either expressly or

impliedly adhere to the DeCoster standard.

See cases cited at

not justice was the goal. Resp's attorney, a competent and
seasoned criminal lawyer throughly experienced in capital cases,
faced with these facts, reached a reasonable tactical decision as
to the only course of action which he thought could result in a
life sentence. Finally, in the dissenters' view, the admission
of the trial judge's testimony was, at worst, harmless error.
Judge Hill wrote a separate dissent, essentially arguing
that the court should reach the prejudice question first by
examining the fairness of the trial instead of attempting to
"convict" the attorney.

-8-

Pages 22-25.
Petr also contends that the decision below misconstrues a
number of this Court's precedents.

u.s.

McMann v. Richardson, 397

759, 770-771 (1970} is improperly extended to create a

"laundry list" of errors for ineffective assistance of counsel
an approach rejected in DeCoster.

The decision also conflicts

with the burden of proof requirements set forth in Engle v.
Issac,

u.s.

and United States v. Agurs, 427

u.s.

97

(1976} and misapplies United States v. Frady, supra, which
rejected a defendant's claims precisely because there was no
likelihood of affecting the outcome of the cause.

The court also

misapplied Fayerweather v. Ritch, supra, in excluding the
testimony of the trial judge, which is the best evidence to
determine whether the outcome of the trial would have been
affected.
Finally, petr argues that the CA and DC gave no weight to
the factual findings of the Fla. courts that counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective, and has ignored resp's abuse of the
writ.
35 states have joined in an amicus brief urging the Court to
grant cert to resolve the conflicts that presently exist among
the states and federal circuits on the effective assistance
question.
Resp. makes three arguments.

(1} The ineffective assistance

question need not be reached because the DC's error in admitting
testimony by the sentencing judge constitutes an independent
nonconstitutional ground for affirming the CA's judgment.

(It is

-9-

clear under Fayerweather v. Ritch, supra, that the evidence was
improperly admitted).

(2) Review at this time is premature

because the CA remanded the case for additional factual
determinations by the DC which could obviate, or at least
clarify, the scope of the constitutional questions involved.

(3)

The en bane decision is consistent with this Court's precedents.
In rejecting the outcome-determinative test of prejudice, which
in resp's view has been adopted only by CA DC in DeCoster, the en
bane court adopted a test of prejudice derived from this Court's
recent decision in United States v. Frady, supra.
4.

DISCUSSION:

This case concerns alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing.

It may be that different

standards govern the sentencing phase of trials, even in capital
cases.

Nevertheless, the CA has structured a standard for the

entire trial process and the fact that this case concerns

capital~

sentencing appears to play no role in the decision. See pA21, n.
12 (rejecting special rule for capital cases).
Although this Court has previously declined to review a
number of petitions involving the effective assistance of counsel
question, this case presents a strong warrant for review.

There

is now a direct conflict on the prejudice showing required for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim between the highest state
court and the highest federal court sitting en bane in the same
jurisdiction as well as a conflict with the DC Circuit's DeCoster
approach. There is more than a semantical difference between
requiring that counsel's deficiency prejudiced defendant to the
extent that "there is a likelihood that the deficient conduct

\

-10affected the outcome of the court proceedings" 394 So.2d at 1001,
and requiring that ineffective assistance "worked to his actual
and substantial disadvantage."
In addition to formulating a prejudice standard, the court
of appeals has written a virtual treatise on effective
representation of counsel with respect to pre-trial
investigation.

Florida does not detail its objections to this

aspect of the opinion, but does claim that it constitutes an
unwarranted expansion on this Court's McMann decision--which is
the wellspring for the "reasonable competency" standard.

This

case presents an opportunity for the Court to pass upon the
"reasonable competency" standard, which is followed in most but
not all jurisdictions.
There is also serious question about the correctness of the
CA's disposition of this case.

Judge Roney's dissent makes a

strong argument that counsel's failure to conduct an
investigation does not constitute ineffective assistance given
the circumstances of the case.
Resp's reasons to decline or defer review are unpersuasive.
The remand to the DC only concerns the application of the en bane
court's legal standards to the particular facts of this case, and
would not obviate the conflict between CA 11 and the Fla. Sup.
Ct.

Similarly, the inadmissibility of the trial judge's

testimony, a decision which appears correct, does not lessen the
warrant for reviewing the CA ll's major pronouncement concerning
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Although resp attempts to

minimize the extent to which the circuits are in conflict, there

-11is no denial of the conflict with the Fla. Sup. Ct. and CA DC on
the prejudice standard.
Finally, I would not HOLD the petn for United States v.
~

Cronic, 82-660, cert. granted, 2/22/83, which also involves an
ineffective assistance issue.

Cronic is a far more limited case-

-CA 10 applied the "reasonable competency" standard to vacate a
conviction on the basis that counsel was inexperienced and had
little time to prepare a defense; the court did not ground its
finding of ineffective assistance in specific acts or omissions.
Cronic does not involve the failure to investigate issue and the
the Court may well not reach the prejudice issue.

If this case

is granted, however, it would make sense to schedule it for
argument back-to-back with Cronic.
I recommend a GRANT.
There is a response, 3 and an amicus brief.
May 25, 1983

Singer

Opn in Appx. petn.

3There is also a motion by resp for IFP status, which was
granted in the lower courts, and should be granted here.

Court ................... .

·voted on .................. , 19 .. .June 2, 1983

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .
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Strickland v. washington

MEMO TO FILE
A memo merely identifying briefly the posture of the
case

and

the

issues.

I

have

read

the

briefs

preliminarily, but need to take a further look, and want a
bench memo.
This is one of the two cases we granted to consider
reversal

by

Courts

of

Appeals

(CAll

in

ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.
is 82-660, Cronic.
Florida

in

As

particular,

seven years after
which he confessed.

is

true of

the

case

this

case)

on

The other case

too many cases

from

is here on the merits

respondent committed three murders to
William Tunkey, described as "one of

the leading criminal defense lawyers in Dade County", was
appointed
advice,

to

represent

respondent.

Against

Tunkey's

respondent confessed and plead guilty.

He also

confessed to a string of burglaries and that his murders
were planned and premeditated.
his

trial

was

not

fair.

Nor

No claim is made here that
is

there

any claim that

respondent was not guilty as charged.

This is, however, a

"sentencing" case.
The

alleged

assistance

ineffective

counsel

of

occurred at the sentencing hearing at which respondent was
sentenced
murder

to death

on

convictions.

each

The

of

the

Court

three

found

first

four

circumstances present at all three murders.

degree

aggravating
Respondent's

counsel averred as statutory litigating circumstances that
respondent had no significant history of prior criminal
activity,

that he acted under

mental disturbance,
age.

Counsel

the

influence of extreme

and that he was twenty-six years of

also

urged

the

court

to

consider

that

respondent had surrendered, confessed, and had not tried
to escape.
The trial court explicitly found,
statutory mitigating

factors

had

however,

been proved,

that no
and held

that any other mitigating circumstances were insufficient
to outweigh

the aggravating circumstances.

Supreme Court

u.s.

affirmed,

and

we

denied

The Florida

certiorari.

441

937 (1979).

Thereafter, and for the first time on a mot ion for
post

conviction

relief

in

state

court,

respondent

contended that Tunkey had rendered ineffective assistance.

The state court denied relief.

In Florida one must prove

(i) "a substantial and serious deficiency measurably below
that of conpetent counsel", and

( i i)

"a 1 ikel ihood that

the deficient conduct affected the outcome of the court
proceedings".

The

state

court

observed

that

the

aggravating circumstances were "simply overwhelming, and
that

respondent

ineffective
present

in

did

not

failing

evidence

circumstances".

to

of

Respondent

contend

that

rebut

them or

any

statutory

did

contend,

Tunkey
in

was

fa i 1 ing

to

litigating
however,

that

Tunkey was ineffective in not conducting an investigation
of

certain

non-statutory mitigating

factors:

Difficult

childhood, lack of a job, new baby, need for money.
Finally,

the

state

trial

court

found

"beyond

any

doubt" that "there is not even the remotest chance that
the outcome would have been any different" if counsel had
taken the measures respondent identified.
The Florida Supreme Court unanimously affirmed

the

trial court's findings and denial of relief.
Respondent

then sought federal habeas,

hearing the DC also denied relief.
counsel

had

erred

in

judgment

in

and after a

The DC did say that
not

conducting

an

investigation of family, friends and medical experts, but
found there was not "a likelihood, or even a significant
possibility,

that

the

balancing

of

aggravating

against

mitigating circumstances ••• would have altered [the death
penalty] in respondent's favor".

Suprisingly, CAll en bane (8-4) vacated and remanded
for

further proceedings.

found

that

Tunkey

It noted that although the DC

committed

an

error

of

stopped short of finding him ineffective.

judgment,

it

The essence of

the remand, as I understand it, is that CAll thought the
District Court should consider further whether Tunkey had
failed to make the investigation referred to by the DC was
justified in doing so because of a "legitimate tactical
choice".
But CAll did make clear that respondent also would
have to demonstrate some degree of prejudice by showing
that counsel's errors resulted in actual and substantial
disadvantage

to

the

course

of

his

defense.

And

if

respondent carried this burden,* the state then must show
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
formulating

this

test,

CAll

declined

to

follow

In
the

decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in U.S. v.
DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (en bane) - a decision that would
require

the defendant

counsel's

errors

had

to demonstrate
an

effect

on

a

the

likelihood
outcome

of

that
the

proceeding.
*Seems to me that the opinions of the state courts make
clear that respondent failed to carry this burden.
I
don't understand why CAll reversed and prolonged this much
litigated case.

The SG's Position
As

stated

in the summary of argument,

the SG says

that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two
independent

elements:

{i)

Proof

that

the

atttorney's

performance fell measurably below the range of competence
demanded

of

defense

substantial prejudice
this case,

counsel,

and

resulted.

{ii)

The

a

showing

SG argues

that

the
in

relief must be denied for failure to satisfy

the prejudice, without regard to whether counsel performed
in a reasonably competent manner.
The SG also relies, as would be expected, on Engle v.
Isaac,

u.s.

456

rationale

of

107

these

and
cases

Frady,
is

456

that

u.s.

when

152.
a

claim

The
of

ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on collateral
attack, a requirement that prejudice be shown is compelled
by the "cause and actual prejudice" standard.
The

SG

argues

that

the

"universally

accepted"

standard in cases where a new trial is sought on the basis
of newly discovered evidence is that the evidence probably
would result in an acquittal {or, vacating of the sentence
of death).
In

sum,

the

SG argues

that

before a defendant

is

constitutionally entitled to a new trial on account of an

alleged failure by his lawyer to investigate and present
certain evidence, he must demonstrate that the "additional
evidence - if presented - probably would have affected the
outcome of the trial".
The SG agrees that CAll correctly held that a showing
of prejudice

is an essential element of an

assistance of counsel claim.

inef feet i ve

Nevertheless, because CAll

remanded the case to the District Court, we should reverse
the

judgment of

the Court of Appeals and direct

it to

affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Respondent's Argument
Respondent
ineffective
whether

argues

that
of

assistance

Br.

has

there

counsel,

it

is

18,

28,

58.

been

immaterial

the case necessarily would

the outcome of

been different.

where

Curiously,

have

respondent

does not ask that we affirm CAll, although it had vacated
and remanded for further proceedings in the DC.

Rather,

respondent wants us to remand to CAll with directions to
apply an entirely different standard.

It, understandably,

disagrees with CAll's view that prejudice must be shown as
every

court

that

has

considered

this

case

exception of CAll - has found no prejudice.

-

with

the

Respondent says
Amendment
and

grounds

not

on

Respondent's
own

the case should be
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Fifth
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to counsel)
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propose
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is that a
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the outcome of the trial.
whether

right

Amendment

"test of prejudice:

habaes

judged on Sixth

serious

4).

It

is

in fact prejudiced

In this case, it is immaterial

investigation that counsel

"failed to make"

would not have affected the courts imposing the sentence
of death.
Respondent

also

relies

on

"several

factors"

that

should be weighed to determine whether the defense in a
particular

case

was

impaired

(Br.

87).

These

include

whether the undivided allegiance of counsel was impaired
(e.g., Cuyler -conflict of interest): the "pervasiveness
of counsel's

inadequacies"; whether counsel's oversights

resulted in impoverished record"; and that "capital cases
demand special efforts by counsel and special sensitivity
by courts to the impact of counsel's actions."
As

I

reversed.

view

it now,

it

is clear

The SG's standard

(p.

that CAll should be

5 above)

seems right to

me.

Unless my clerk has a different view, a brief summary

- a couple of pages - of his or her views will suffice.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

No. 82-1554
(Argument date January 10, 1984)
Cammie R. Robinson

Strickland v. Washington

December 30, 1983

Question Presented

What is the proper standard of prejudice applicable to a
collateral attack on a death sentence that is based on a claim
that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate, develop,
and present additional evidence at the sentencing hearing?

I.

DISCUSSION

I agree with your memo of December 28, 1983 that the
state courts and the DC applied the correct standard of prejudice
and that the judgment of CAll should be reversed.

A. Proper Standard of Prejudice

This case presents a quarrel over the proper standard of
prejudice applicable to a habeas claim that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to investigate, develop, and
present additional evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital
case.

The choice is between the standard of prejudice

articulated in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (CADC),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1976)

(likelihood that inadequacy

affected the outcome}, and the standard articulated in CAll's en
bane opinion (inadequacy worked to defendant's actual and
substantial disadvantage} •
'

CAll expressly rejected the Decoster

standard that both the state court and the DC had applied on two
grounds: (1} the standard would require the petitioner to carry a
burden of showing prejudice that is greater than the "actual

.

.

cause and prejudice" showing required by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 87 (1977}; and, (2} it is proper, with respect to
ineffective assitance claims alleging failure to produce relevant
evidence, for petitioner to bear the burden of showing what
evidence should have been produced, but it is not proper to
require petitioner to bear the burden of showing that production

of this evidence would have effected the trial outcome.

I

disagree with both these reasons.
CAll is incorrect that requiring a habeas petitioner to
meet the Decoster standard would impose a greater burden than the
"actual cause and prejudice " standard of Wainwright.
observed in United States v. Frady, 456

u.s.

This Court

152, 168 (1982),

that Wainwright had "refrained from giving 'precise content' to
the term 'prejudice,' expressly leaving to future cases further
elaboration of the significance of that term."

Frady gave

content to the term "prejudice" only in the context of a
collateral attack on jury instructions and indicated that "the
import of the term in other situations
question."

456

u.s.,

at 168.

remains an open

Nothing in this Court's opinions

suggests that the Decoster court's definition of prejudice in the
present context is inconsistent with the "actual cause and
prejudice" standard announced in Wainwright.
CAll's reasoning on its second point is also flawed.

It

reasoned that it was inappropriate to require petitioner to show
that counsel's failure to investigate, develop, and produce
additional evidence was outcome determinative because petitioner
"is no better situated than the state to demonstrate that the new
evidence was likely to alter the outcome of the case."
Pet. App. at A72.

There are two flaws to this argument.

Cert.
First,

Decoster does not require that petitioner show that the
additional evidence would have been outcome determinative, but
only that it was likely to affect the outcome.

Once petitioner

has made that showing, the State may show that the additional

bench memo: Strickland v. washington, No. 82-1554

evidence in fact was not outcome determinative.

page 4

Second, it is

common on motions for new trials based on the alleged discovery
of new evidence to require the movant to show that the new
/)_

.

evidence would have had a l1kely

effec~

~

on the trial.

See,

~,

Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 and cases cited in SG's Brief at 19 n.lO.
This showing is required on direct review.

Because of the

greater interests in protecting the finality of judgments from
collateral attack, see Frady, 456

u.s.,

at 166, it would be

inconsistent with this Court's decisions to impose a lesser
burden on

ha~

petitioners.

~r ~;e~ ,

~~

if counsel's--failure

investigate, develop, or produce additional evidence had no
likelihood of affecting the outcome of the proceedings, it is

~
~a..

if/L

~~

hard to see how a habeas petitioner has been denied his
onstitutional right to effective counsel.

There certainly is no

constitutional guarantee that counsel will be perfect.
I agree with the SG that the standard of prejudice

......----...-

applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should
~

I/

focus on the particular nature of the claimed inadequacy and
.... .
---------~--f~-----------------------------should not be applied
categorically to all ineffective assistance
claims.

SG's Brief at 18.

Thus, the Court should make clear

that whatever standard of prejudice articulated in this case
controls only ineffective assistance claims based on counsel's
alleged failure to investigate, develop, and produce additional
evidence.

In this narrow context, I believe that the Decoster

standard applied by the state court and the DC sets forth the
appropriate standard of prejudice.

Under this standard, it is
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~

applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim sl
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focus on the particular nature of the claimed inadequacy at

~·
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should not be applied categorically to all ineffective assistance

claims.

SG's Brief at 18.

Thus, the Court should make clear

that whatever standard of prejudice articulated in this case
controls only ineffective assistance claims based on counsel's
alleged failure to investigate, develop, and produce additional
evidence.

In this narrow context, I believe that the Decoster

standard applied by the state court and the DC sets forth the
appropriate standard of prejudice.

Under this standard, it is

clear that washington's habeas petition should be denied and the
order of CAll reversed.

B. Application of the Standard to Facts of this Case

Washington's
attack on his counsel's performance at
_____.,.
sentencing is narrow.

He concedes that the State produced

overwelming evidence proving the existence of 5 statutory
aggravating circumstances.

He does not dispute that counsel

could have produced additional evidence of statutory mitigating
circumstances.
in ~ tiga~e,

He claims only that counsel failed adequately to

develop, and produce evidence of non-statutory

mitigating circumstances.

Specifically, Washington claims

his counsel was ineffective in

faili~g

to do 5 things:

(1) to

obtain a psychiatric evaluation determining his mental state a
the time of the

crime~

(2) to investigate readily available

witnesses concerning his character and

background~

(3) to reque t

a presentence report (4) to present a meaningful closing
argument~

and, (5) to secure an independent evaluation of the

reports of the medical examiners.

The evidence that Washington

claims his counsel should have produced consists of 14 affidavits
of family and friends testifying to the effect that they knew
defendant to be a "good person" who worked hard, was not prone to
violence, and had no prior history of criminal

activity~

and, the

reports of a psychologist and a psychiatrist indicating their
opinion

that~ashington

time of the crimes.

was legally sane, but depressed at the

Both the state court and the DC examined the

proffered evidence and each of the alleged failings of counsel
and determined that none had any likelihood of affecting the ?

~

outcome of the sentencing proceedings.

~ ~~G
~T~

As to the claims concerning the failure to secure
psychiatric evaluations, the state court and the DC found that
such evaluations likely would have done more harm than good: all
indications were that Washington was sane at the time of the
crime and that, contrary to defense counsel's argument at the
sentencing proceeding, he was not operating under extreme
emotional distress.
these indications.

The proffered psychiatric reports support
If counsel had attempted to introduce any

psychiatric evidence to support his argument, it probably would
have been destroyed on cross-examination.

See State Court

Opinion, Cert. Pet. App. at A221-223; DC Opinion, Cert. Pet. App.
at A275-276.

As to the claim concerning the failure to request a

presentence report, the state court and the DC found that such a
request likely would have done more harm than good: defense
counsel successfully excluded Washington's "rap sheet," which I
suppose would have disclosed any of defendant's prior criminal
activity; any presentence report would have included this "rap
sheet" and would have put before the judge all of defendant's
prior criminal activities. 1

See State Court Opinion, Cert. Pet.

App. at A227-228; DC Opinion, Cert. Pet. App. at A280.

As to the

claim concerning failure to investigate available witnesses, the

1 I have not found any reference describing what if any prior
criminal acts were committed by defendant.

state court and the DC examined the 14 affidavits and found that
they contained much the same evidence presented in Washington's
detailed confessions, that they disclosed that the affiants were
unaware of Washington's prior criminal record, and thus that they
could have been destroyed on cross-examination.

See State Court

Opinion, Cert. Pet. App. at A224-225; DC Opinion, Cert. Pet. App.
at A264-267.

After conducting these detailed examinations of

Washington's claims, both the state court and the DC made the
determination that he had not shown any likelihood that any of
the evidence that counsel allegedly should have produced would
have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. 2

Because

there is no reason to question these determinations, I recommend
that the Court reverse the judgment of CAll and order that
Washington's habeas petition be denied.

Because the prejudi

determinations of the state court and the DC were made
independently of the testimony of Judge Fuller, there is no
for this Court to determine whether that testimony was
admissible.

--

2The state court of appeals held that "the record affirmatively
demonstrates beyond any doubt that even if Mr. Tunkey had done
each of the foregoing things at the time of the sentencing, there
is not even the remotest chance that the outcome would have been
any different." Cert. Pet. App. at A230. The Supreme Court
affirmed unanimously, stating that "we believe, to the point of
moral certainty, that [defendant] is entitled to no relief."
Cert. Pet. App. at A250. The DC held an evidentiary hearing
during which it examined the evidence that counsel allegedly
should have introduced. It held that "there does not appear to
be a likelihood, or even a significant possibility that the
balancing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances under
the Florida death penalty statute would have been altered in
[defendant's] favor." Cert. Pet. App. at A286.
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burden on the pe{itioner to demonstrate pre-

l ysis in Davis

judice or the likelihood that cpunsel'

d that in at least

e Court found

(naction affected the outcome of the sentence,
$.........
....,...-, ......~,....
i~_appropriate here.
See~ United State

JiOUt inquiring

v. Decoster, suEra at 208.

i c e.

Id. at

------

In applying the standard to the facts at

--

t ed States, 425

hand, I find no showing of prejudice.

w York, 422 U.S.

reaching this determination, I have consider-

.r kansas, 435

ed Judge Fuller's testimony that even if he

, the Fifth

had considered the live testimony of character

every variety of

and psychiatric witnesses, as proposed in the

.ld be treated

affidavits, he believes he would have imposed

· has not ade-

the death sentence. However,

defense, it
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potential weakness of hindsight
,....----:

In

anal ~sis,

I

-

tys, be appro-

have not treated Judge Fuller's testimony

tdant was pre-

as determinative on the issue of prejudice.

trial."

Id.

in capital cases.
tiled to make the
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~ ienced criminal
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erwhelmiing si~..ua~......- ,

------------

psychiatric

testim~ny,

and weighing it aaainst

the detailed record of petitioner's conduct

in

initiat~ng

and carrying out three separate

episodes of planned robbery, kidnapping and

\

\

.

A286
murder, there does not appear to be a likeli-

''

hood, or even a significant possibility that

circumstances under the Florida death penalty
statute would have been altered in petitioner's
favor.

Critically, the character and medical

testimony ,cannot reasonably be characterized
as evidence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.

Nore does it provide persuasive

rationalization for petitioner's extended and
calculated course of violence.

.........

Therefore,

it my determination on the critical legal
A

~

-

issue, that petitioner was not prejudiced by
.......__.....

,.,..

................-

,....

~

the inaction which did occur, and was not
denied his Constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel, as that standard is
defined under present case law.
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, During a ten-day period in September 1976, respondent
~ planned and committed three groups of crimes, which int'J
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eluded three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnapping, J ~ rU_tJ
~ ·
severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, ~ ~
~
and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, rek._
spondent surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a 'S tJ
~~
lengthy statement confessing to the third of the criminal epi- ~ ~ ~
~~
sodes. The State of Florida indicted respondent for kidnapt
- ping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal law- fVYL 2 3-2
~ j
yer to represent him.
'
.J'f _ •
Counsel actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery.
~ ~
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multiple counts of robbery, kidnapping for ransom, breaking
and entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy
to commit robbery. Respondent waived his right to a jury
trial, again acting against counsel's advice, and pleaded guilty
to all charges, including the three capital murder charges.
In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that,
although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no
significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his
criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. App. 50-53. He also stated,
however, that he accepted responsibility for the crimes.
E. g., App. 54, 57. The trial judge told respondent that he
had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step
forward and admit their responsibility" but that he was making no statement at all about his likely sentencing decision.
App. 62.
Counsel advised respondent to invoke his right under Florida law to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing.
Respondent rejected the advice and waived the right. He
chose instead to be sente:l)ced by the trial judge without a
jury recommendation.
In preparing for the sentencing hearing, counsel spoke
with respondent about his background. He also spoke on
the telephone with respondent's wife and mother, though he
did not follow up on the one unsuccessful effort to meet with
them. He did not otherwise seek out character witnesses
for respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. A265. Nor did he
request a psychiatric examination, since his conversations
with his client gave no indication that respondent had psychological problems. I d., at A266.
Counsel decided not to present and hence not to look further for evidence concerning respondent's character and emotional state. That decision reflected trial counsel's sense of
hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of respondent's confessions to the gruesome crimes. See id., at
A282. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable to
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rely on the plea colloquy for evidence about respondent's
background and about his claim of emotional stress: the plea
colloquy communicated sufficient information about these
subjects, and by foregoing the opportunity to present new
evidence on these subjects, counsel prevented the State from
cross-examining respondent on his claim and from putting on
psychiatric evidence of its own. I d., at A223-A225.
Counsel also excluded from the sentencing hearing other
evidence he thought was potentially damaging. He successfully moved to exclude respondent's "rap sheet." !d., at
A227; App. 311. Because he judged that a presentence report might prove more detrimental than helpful, as it would
have included respondent's criminal history and thereby undermined the claim of no significant history of criminal activity, he did not request that one be prepared. App. to Pet.
for Cert. A227-A228, A265-A266.
At the sentencing hearing, counsel's strategy was based
primarily on the trial judge's remarks at the plea colloquy as
well as on his reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it
important for a convicted defendant to own up to his crime.
He argued that respondent's remorse and acceptance of
responsibility justified sparing him from the death penalty.
I d., at A265-A266. Counsel argued that respondent had no
history of criminal activity and that respondent committed
the crimes under extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
thus coming within the statutory list of mitigating circumstances. He also argued that respondent should be spared
death because he had surrendered, confessed, and offered to
testify against a co-defendant and because respondent was
fundamentally a good person who had briefly gone badly
wrong in extremely stressful circumstances. The State put
on evidence and witnesses largely for the purpose of describing the details of the crimes. Counsel did not cross-examine
the medical experts who testified about the manner of death
of respondent's victims.

82-1554--0PINION
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The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances
with respect to each of the three murders. He found that all
three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel,
all involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were
committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and
violent felony, and since all involved robbery, the murders
were for pecuniary gain. All three murders were committed
to avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder
law enforcement. In the course of one of the murders, respondent knowingly subjected numerous persons to a grave
risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting the murder victim's sisters-in-law, who sustained severe--in one
case, ultimately fatal-injuries.
With respect to mitigating circumstances, the trial judge
made the same findings for all three capital murders. First,
although there was no admitted evidence of prior convictions,
respondent had stated that he had engaged in a course of
stealing. In any case, even if respondent had no significant
history of criminal activity, the aggravating circumstances
"would still clearly far outweigh" that mitigating factor.
Second, the judge found that, during all three crimes, respondent was not suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance and could appreciate the criminality of his
acts.
Third, none of the victims was a participant in, or
consented to, respondent's conduct. ·Fourth, respondent's
participation in the crimes was neither minor nor the result of
duress or domination by an accomplice. Finally, respondent's age (26) could not be considered a factor in mitigation,
especially when viewed in light of respondent's planning of
the crimes and disposition of the proceeds of the various accompanying thefts.
In short, the trial judge found numerous aggravating circumstances and no (or a single comparatively insignificant)
mitigating circumstance. With respect to each of the three
convictions for capital murder, the trial judge concluded: "A
careful consideration of all matters presented to the court im-
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pels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances .
. . ."See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 663-664 (Fla.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 937 (1979) (quoting trial court
findings). He therefore sentenced respondent to death on
each of the three counts of murder and to prison terms for the
other crimes. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Ibid.
B

Respondent subsequently sought collateral relief in state
court on numerous grounds, among them that counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding.
Respondent challenged counsel's assistance in six respects.
He asserted that counsef was ineffective because he fa1led to
move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request
a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character
witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to
present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and
to investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine the medical experts. In support of the claim, respondent
submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neignbors, and
rel~stafing1ll:anliey wou
ave testified 1f asKed to do
so:-Hearso submitted one psychiatric report and one psychological report stating that respondent, though no under
the ~m uence o extreme mental or emotion disturbance, was
"chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma" at the time of his crimes. App. 7; see also
id., at 14.
The trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the record evidence conclusively showed
that the ineffectiveness claim was meritless. App. to Pet.
for Cert. A20~A243. Four of the assertedly prejudicial errors required little discussion. First, there were no grounds
to request a continuance, so there was no error in not requesting one when respondent pleaded guilty. ld., at
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A218-A220. Second, failure to request a presentence investigation was not a serious error because the trial judge had
discretion not to grant such a request and because any
presentence investigation would have resulted in admission
of respondent's rap sheet and thus undermined his assertion
of no significant history of criminal activity. I d., at
A226-A228. Third, the argument and memorandum given
to the sentencing judge were "admirable" in light of the overwhelming aggravating circumstances and absence of mitigating circumstances. Id., at A228. Fourth, there was no
error in failure to examine the medical examiner's reports or
to cross-examine the medical witnesses testifying on the
manner of death of respondent's victims, since respondent
admitted that the victims died in the ways shown by the unchallenged medical evidence. I d., at A229.
The trial court dealt at greater length with the two other
bases for the ineffectiveness claim. The court pointed out
that a psychiatric examination of respondent was conducted
by state order soon after respondent's initial arraignment.
That report states that there was no indication of major mental illness at the time of the crimes. Moreover, both the reports submitted in the collateral proceeding state that, although respondent was "chronically frustrated and depressed
because of his economic dilemma," he was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. All three
reports thus directly undermine the contention made at the
sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance during his crime
spree. Accordingly, counsel could reasonably decide not to
seek psychiatric reports; indeed, by relying solely on the plea
colloquy to support the emotional disturbance contention,
counsel denied the State an opportunity to rebut his claim
with psychiatric testimony. In any event, the aggravating
circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial
prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the psychiatric evidence offered in the collateral attack.
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The court rejected the challenge to counsel's failure to develop and to present character evidence for much the same
reasons. The affidavits submitted in the collateral proceeding showed nothing more than that certain persons would
have testified that respondent was basically a good person
who was worried about his family's financial problems. Respondent himself had already testified along those lines at the
plea colloquy. Moreover, respondent's admission of a course
of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affidavits. For those reasons, and because the sentencing judge
stated that the death sentence would be appropriate even if
respondent had no significant prior criminal history, no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of
the character evidence offered in the collateral attack.
Applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394
So. 2d 997 (Fla. 198n , tfiefr laf coUrt concluded that respondent had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome of
the sentencing proceeding. The court specifically found
that, "as a matter of law, the record affirmatively demonstrates beyond any doubt that even if [counsel] had done each
of the ... things [that respondent alleged counsel had failed
to do] at the time of sentencing, there is not even the remotest chance that the outcome would have been any different.
The plain fact is that the aggravating circumstances proved
in this case were completely overwhelming. . . ." App. to
Pet. for Cert. A230.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief.
Washington v. State , 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981). For essentially the reasons given by the trial court, the supreme court
concluded that respondent had failed to make out a prima
facie case of either "substantial deficiency or possible prejudice" and, indeed, had "failed to such a degree that we believe, to the ppint of a moral certainty, that he is entitled to
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no relief. . . . " Id., at 287. Respondent's claims were
"shown conclusively to be without merit so as to obviate the
need for an evidentiary hearing." Id., at 286.

c
Respondent next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus /
in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida. He advanced numerous grounds for relief,
among them ineffective assistance of counsel based on the
same errors, except for the failure to move for a continuance,
as tho
e had identified in state court. The District Court
held n evidentiary hearin to inquire into tnal counsel'S efforts to inves 1gate an o pre~tances.
Respon en o ffere
e a aav1 s and repo s e ha submitted in state collateral proceedings; he also called his trial
counsel to testify, The State of Florida, over respondent's
objection, called the trial judge to testify.
The District Court disputed none of the state court factual
findings concerning trial counsel's assistance and made findings of its own that are consistent with the state court findings. The account of trial counsel's actions and decisions
given above reflects the combined findings. On the legal
issue of ineffectiveness, the District Court concluded that, although trial counsel made errors in judgment in failing to investigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence further than he
did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any
such error in judgment. Relying in part on the trial judge's
testimony but also on the same factors that led the state
courts to find no prejudice, the District Court concluded that
"there does not appear to be a likelihood, or even a significant
possibility," that any errors of trial counsel had affected the
outcome of the sentencing proceeding. App. to Pet. for
Cert. A285-A286. The District Court went on to reject all
of respondent's other grounds for relief, including .one not exhausted in state court, which the District Court considered
because, among other reasons, the state urged its consider-

""VI ~ J...f-/(
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ation. I d., at A286-A292. The court accordingly denied
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affinned in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to apply to the particular facts the
framework for analyzing ineffectiveness claims that it devel~
oped in its opinion. 673 F. 2d 879 (1982). The panel decision was itself vacated when Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit, ec1 e to rehear the case en
bane. 679 F. 2d 23 (1982). The ful ourt o
ea s evelope Its o~ framework for an~Zing ineffective assistance
claims and reverSeCftlie juogment of the District Court and
remanded the case for new factfinding under the newly announced standards. 693 F. 2d 1243 (1982).
The court noted at the outset that, because respondent had
raised an unexhausted claim at his evidentiary hearing in the
District Court, the habeas petition might be characterized as
a mixed petition subject to the rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455
U. S. 509 (1982), requiring dismissal offue entire petition.
The court held, however, that the exhaustion requirement is
"a rriatter of comity rather than a matter of jurisdiction" and
hence admitted of exceptions. The court agreed with the
District Court that this case came within an exception to the
mixed petition rule. 693 F. 2d, at 1248, n. 7.
Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals stated that the
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel accorded
criminal defendants a right to "counsel reasonably likely to
render and rendering reasonabl ef ectlve assistance given
the o a 1ty o t e circumstances." I d., at 1
he court
remarke in passmg a no special standard applies in capital cases such as the one before it: the punishment that a defendant faces is merely one of the circumstances to be considered in determining whether counsel was reasonably
effective. !d., at 1250, n. 12. The court then addressed respondent's contention that his trial counsel's assistance was
~

(! H 11

/)

Q• ~

82-1554-0PINION

10

STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON

not reasonably effective because counsel breached his duty to
investigate nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.
The co~ agreed that the Sixth Amendment imposes on
counsel ~ut to investigate, because reasonably effective
assistance must be base on professional decisions and informed legal choices can be made only after investigation of
options. The court observed that counsel's investigatory decisions must be assessed in light of the information known at
the time of the decisions, not in hindsight, and that "[t]he
amount of pretrial investigation that is reasonable defies precise measurement." !d., at 1251. Nevertheless, putting
guilty-plea cases to one side, the court attempted to classify
cases presenting issues concernin~ to
inves 1ga e e or p oce 1 g o ria .
t ere is o y one p aus1 e me of defense, the court concluded, counsel must conduct a "reasonably substantial investigation" into that line of defense; since there can be no strategic choice that renders such an investigation unnecessary.
I d., at 1252. The same duty exists if counsel relies at trial
on only one line of defense, although others are available. In
either case, the investigation need not be exhaustive. It
must include "'an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved.'" I d. , at 1253
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F. 2d 103, 104 (CA5 1979)).
The scope of the duty, however, depends on such facts as the
strength of the government's case and the likelihood that
pursuing certain leads may prove more harmful than helpful.
I d., at 1253, n. 16.
If there is more than one plausible line of defense, the court
held, counsel should ideally investigate each line substantially before making a strategic choice about which lines to
rely on at trial. If counsel conducts such substantial investigations, the strategic choices made as a result "will seldom if
ever" be found wanting. Because advocacy is an art and not
a science, and because the adversary system requires deference to counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices must
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be respected in these circumstances if they are based on professional judgment. I d., at 1254.
If counsel does not conduct a substantial investigation into
each of several plausible lines of defense, assistance may
nonetheless be effective. Counsel may not exclude certain
lines of defense for other than strategic reasons.
I d., at
1257-1258. Limitations of time and money, however, may
force early strategic choices, often based solely on conversations with the defendant and a review of the prosecution's evidence. Those strategic choices about which lines of defense
to pursue are owed deference commensurate with the reasonableness of the professional judgments on which they are
based. Thus, "when counsel's assumptions are reasonable
given the totality of the circumstances and when counsel's
strategy represents a reasonable choice based upon those assumptions, counsel need not investigate lines of defense that
he has chosen not to employ at trial." I d., at 1255 (footnote
omitted). Among the factors relevant to deciding whether
particular strategic choices are reasonable are the experience
of the attorney, the inconsistency of unpursued and pursued
lines of defense, and the potential for prejudice from taking
an unpursued line of defense. I d., at 1256-1257, n. 23.
Having outlined the standards for judging whether defense
counsel fulfilled the duty to investi e the C
of Appeals
turned its attention to the uestion of the re 'udic to the defense that must be shown before counsel's errors justify reversal of the judgment. The court observed that only in
cases of outright denial of counsel, of affirmative government
interference in the representation process, or of inherently
prejudicial conflicts of interest had this ·Court said that no
special showing of prejudice need be made. I d., at
1258-1259. For cases of deficient performance by counsel,
where the government is not directly responsible for the deficiencies and where evidence of deficiency may be more accessible to the defendant than to the prosecution, the defendant ,6 ~
must show that counsel's errors "resulted in actual and sub- ~ ~

~5~
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stantial disadvantage to the course of his defense." I d., at
1262. This standard, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is compatible with the "cause and prejudice" standard for overcoming procedural defaults in federal collateral proceedings and
discourages insubstantial claims by requiring more than a
showing, which could virtually always be made, of some conceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel's errors .
. The specified showing of prejudice would result in reversal of
the judgment, the court concluded, unless the prosecution
showed that the constitutionally deficient performance was,
in light of all the evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. !d., at 1260-1262.
The Court of Appeals thus laid down the tests to be applied
in the Eleventh C1rCulrm cEalTenges to convictions on the
ground of ineffectiveness of counsel. Although some of the
judges of the court proposed different approaches to judging
ineffectiveness claims either generally or when raised in federal habeas petitions from state prisoners, id., at 1264-1280
(opinion of Tjoflat, J.); i d., at 1280 (opinion of Clark, J.); id.,
at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay, J., and
James C. Hill, J.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), and
although some believed that no remand was necessary in this
case, id. at 1281-1285 (opinion of Frank M. Johnson, Jr., J.,
joined by Anderson, J.); id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney,
J., joined by Fay, J., and James C. Hill J :); id. , at 1288-1291
(opinion of Hill, J.), majority of the judge of the en bane
court agreed that the case s ou
e remanded for application
of the newly announced st andards.---s-ummar1ly reJecting respo~11er tnan n1effectiveness of counsel, the
court accordingly reversed the judgment of the District
Court and remanded the case. On remand, the court finally
ruled, the state trial judge's testimony, though admissible "to
the extent that it coptains personal knowledge of historical
facts or expert opinion," was not to be considered admitted
into evidence to explain the judge's mental processes in

C IJ.-
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reaching his sentencing decision. I d., at 1262-1263; see
Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, 306--307 (1904).
D

Petitioners, who are officials of the State of Florida, filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The petition presents a type of
Sixth Amendment claim that this Court has not previously
considered in any generality. The Co~rt has considered
Sixth Amendment claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well as claims
based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused. E. g., United States
v. Cronic, ante. With the exception of Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U. S. 335 (1980), however, which invofved a claim that
counsel's assistance was rendered ineffective by a conflict of
interest, the Court has never directly" and full addressed a
cla~f "actua ine ec 1v ness o counse s assistance in a
case going to tnal. Cf. me tates v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97,
102, n. 5 (1976).
In assessing attorney performance, all the Federal Courts
J?
. ~
of Appeals and all but a few state courts have now aaopted
.1
the 'rea o abl effective assistance''?standard']in one for- ~~\.
mulation or another.
ee rapnell v. United States, 725 F.
2d ~A2 1983); Brief for United States in United
States v. Cronic, 0. T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 3a-6a; Sarno,
Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State Courts as to
Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal
Client, 2 A. L. R. 4th 99-157, §§ 7-10 (1980). Yet this Court
has not had occasion squarely to decide whether that is the
proper standard. With respect to the prejudice that a defendant must show from deficient attorney performance, the
lower courts have adopted tests that purport to differ in more
than formulation. See Brief for United States in United
States v. Cronic, 0. T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 7a-10a; Sarno,
supra, at 83-99, § 6. In particular, the Court of Appeals in
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this case expressly rejected the prejudice standard articulated by Judge Leventhal in his plurality opinion in United
States v. Decoster, 624 F. 2
6,
, 211- 12 (CADC) (en
bane), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 944 (1979), and adopted by the
State of Florida in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. \
1981), a standard that requires a showin that s ecified deficient conduct of counse was e y to ave a ected t e outcome of the
eeding. 693 F. 2 , a 1 -1 2.
For these reasons, we granted certiorari to consider the ~ ~
standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitu- ~ L/1....(__~'"
tion requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because
of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel. - - U. S.
- - (1983). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
exhaustion rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions,
though to be strictly enforced, is not jurisdictional. See
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 515-520 (1982). We therefore
address the merits of the constitutional issue.
II

In a long line of cases that includes Powell v. Alabama, 287
U. S. 45 (1932), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), this Court has
recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists,
and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a
fair trial. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through
the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of
a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
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for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
Thus, a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The
right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system
embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's
skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the
"ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution" to
which they are entitled. Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275, 276 (1942); see Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 68-69.
Because of the vital importance of counsel's assistance, this
Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person accused ofa federal or state crime has the right to have counsel
appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained. See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. That a person who
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the c·onstitutional
command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to
the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.
For that reason, the Court has recognized that "the right
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970).
Government violates the right to effective assistance when it
interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.
See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976) (bar
on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U. S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at
bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 612-613
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(1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness);
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 593--596 (1961) (bar on
direct examination of defendant). Counsel, however, can
also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance,
simply by failing to render "adequate legal assistance,"
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 344. I d., at 345--350 (actual
conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer's performance
renders assistance ineffective).
The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance in the latter
class of cases-that is, those presenting claims of "actual ineffectiveness ." In giving meaning to the requirement, however, we must take its purpose-to~sure a fair trial-as the
guide. The benclimark for judging any claim of ineffectlvenessmust be whether counsel's conduct so u
. in the
proper functioning o
e a versarial process that the trial
{ cannot oe relled on asffiviilgJ).zya-uced al ust resu~
The same principle apj)iies to a•cap'ital sentenc'rng proceeding such as that provided by Florida law. We need not consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which may
involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in
the sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to
the definition of constitutionally effective assistance. A capital sentencing proceeding like the one i:r:!Yolved in th!§.. case,
however~tly like a trial 'in its adversarial format
an<riilthe existence of staooaras foraecision, see Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U. S. - -, - - (1983); Bullington v. Missouri ,
451 U. S. 430 (1980), that counsel's role in the proceeding is
comparable to counsel's role at trial-to ensure that the adversarial testin rocess works to roduce a 'ust result under
the s an ar s governmg ec1s10n.
or purposes o escribing counsel's duties, therefore, Florida's capital sentencing
proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial.

III
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death

•
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sentence has two components. ~' the defendant must
show that counsel's erformance was deficient. This requires s owing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" aranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
econ9) the defendant
must show that the deficient _performance 2 rejudiced the defense. This requiressnowrng that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable". Un!eSs'1t defendant makeSboth
showmgs, 1t cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.
A
As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held, the
proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective ass!§1ance. See Trapnell v. United States, 725
F. 2d, at - - . The Court indirectly recognized as much
when it stated in McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 770, 771,
that a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate
legal advice unless counsel was not "a reasonably competent
attorney" and the advice was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." See also
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 344. When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of' counsel's assistance, the defendant must .show that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth
Amendment refers simply to "counsel," not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead
on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient
to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the
role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions.
See Michel v. New York, 350 U. S. 91, 100-101 (1955). The
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasu a eness un er pre.va1 n pro essional norms.
Representation of a, cr1mma defen ant entails certain basic
duties.
Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and
...___-
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hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to
avoid conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at
346. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant
derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's
cause and the more particular duties to consult wi~e defendant on important decisions and to eep e efendant informed of important developments in t e course o the proseciitiOIL" Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill
and knowledge as will re:n_der the trial a reliable adversarial
testing pro~s. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., at

j-

6~9.

These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of
attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether
counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms· of practi ce as reflected in
American Bar Association standards and the like, e. g. , ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980)
("The Defense Function"), are guides to determining what is
reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of ]
e acdetailed rules for counsel's conduct can satlsfacton
coun o e variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or e range o egltl_!!!~!~.._<!~i~~ best to
repr~rae!enaant. A ny such set of rules would
interfe~nstitutionally protected independence of
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in
making tactical decisions. See United States v. Decoster,
624 F. 2d, at 208. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause.
Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure
that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.

~
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Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to secondguess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf.
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 133-134 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time. In addition, in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a stron presumption that counsel's conduct falls within /.2.-~
the wide ran e o reasona e ro esswna ass1s ance. See
Miche v. ew or , supra, at
ere are countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even
the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. See Goodpaster, The Trial
for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 343 (1983).
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney
vr~
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would
encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.
~~
Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would
increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of
counsel's unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and
even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of
assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney
and client.
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on
the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of inef-

82-1554-0PINION

20

STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON

fective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then determine
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance. In making that determination, the
court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the
same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.
These standards require no special amplification in order to
define counsel's duty
to investigate, the duty
...
- at issue in this
case. As the Court of Appeals concluded, strategic choices
made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant
to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable profess!onal judgments support the limitations on investigation.
In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.
The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined
or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite
properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends
critically on such information. For example, when the facts
that support a certain potential line of defense are generally
known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the

arr--
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need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether. And when a defendant has
given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure
to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as
unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel's conversations
with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of
counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a
proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions.
See United States v. Decoster, 624 F. 2d, at 209-210.
B

An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, \
does not warrant setting aside the ·ud ent of a criminal
procee mg
e error ad no effect on th.e J~ent. Cf.
Unitea States v. M orrison,449' U. S: 361-;- 3~5 (1981).
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is
to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, an deficiencies in counsel's erformance
e rejudicial to t
en e m or er to constl ute meffective assistance under the Constitution.
In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is pre- /3u.:t~~
sumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
~ ~
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.
So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's as- ~
sistance. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at - - - - & n. 25. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that
case by case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.
Id., at--. Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify
and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly
responsible, easy for the government to prevent.
One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar,
though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 345-350, the Court held that preju-
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dice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches
the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect
on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of
interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in
certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e. g.,
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal
justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed
prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not
quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the · th
Amen ment claims mentiOned above.
rejudice is presume on y if tne de endantdemonstrates that counsel "actively represented conflicting interests" and "that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his ·lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 350, 348 (footnote
omitted).
Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a gene al re uirement that the defendant affirmativ~ly ~Eve pr~ce. The government is not responsible
for, an ence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will
result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly
harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial.
They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing
prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision
to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to
avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that
is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in
another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of
counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must
show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.
It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors
had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceed-

1.
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ing. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet
that test, cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S.
858, 866-867 (1982), and not every error that conceivably
could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability
of the result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a showing that the errors "impaired the presentation
of the defense." Brief of Respondent 58. That standard,
however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if
it is indeed an error, "impairs" the presentation of the defense, the proposed standard is inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently
serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the
proceeding.
On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not
show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than notaltered the outcome in the case. T h1s outcome::.determinative
stan ard has severa strengths. It defines the relevant inquiry in a way familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is inevitable, is anything but precise. The standard also reflects
the profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings.
Moreover, it com orts with the widely used standard for assessi:r_!g motio.!l§jQr new trial base on newly discovered evidence.
----.., See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20
& nn. 10, 11. Nevertheless, the standard is not quite
appropriate.
Even when the specified attorney error results in the omission of certain evidence, the newly discovered evidence
standard is not an apt source from which to draw a prejudice
standard for ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for
newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106, 112
(1946). An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence
of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding1 s re~ ffiiality concerns are somewhat weaker and

7
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the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat
lower. The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreli- \ ?
able, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors
of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance oft e evidence to ave e ermme
e outcome.
Accordmgry,-the appropriate test for prejudice finds its
roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information
not disclosed to the defense y the prosecu wn, nited States
v. Agurs, 427 U. S., at 104, 112-113, and in the test formateriality of testimony made unavailabre to the defense by
government deportation of a witness, United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S., at 872-874. The defendant / LJ ~ fmust show that there is a/reasonable probability _E.t, but for ~
counse 's unprofessional errors, t ~ proc~ding I\ .
~ ... 1. d.
would have been iffe nt. A reasonable probability is a ~
proba ility sufficient to undermine confidence in the /~~ ,.
-o./ 1/J.-~
outcome.
.
In making the determination whether the specified errors ~ f /~,_ tf "
resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume,
absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary
insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law.
An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to
the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness,
whimsy, caprice, "nullification," ·and the like. A defendant
has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker,
even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assessment of prejudice must assume that the decision was made
according to the governing legal standard. Thus, when a defendant challenges the conviction, the question is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting
guilt. When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as
the one at issue in this case, the question is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.
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In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality o~e before ~gej?J jury. Some of the factual ffudings will have
been unaffeCfed by the errors, and factual findings that were
affected will have been affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.
Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by
the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than
one with overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making
the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the
burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.
IV

A number of practical considerations are important for the
application of the standards we have outlined. Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have
stated do not establish mechanical rules. Although those
principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate
focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding w.!J.ose result is being cliallengeO. In every case
the court should be concerned with whether, despite the
strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular
proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just
results.
To the extent that this has already been the guiding inquiry in the lower courts, the standards articulated today do
not require reconsideration of ineffectiveness claims rejected
under different standards. Cf. Trapnell v. United States,
725 F. 2d, at - - - - - (in several years of applying "farce
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and mockery" standard along with "reasonable competence"
standard, court "never found that the result of a case hinged
on the choice of a particular standard"). In particular, the
minor differences in the lower courts' precise formulations of
the performance standard are insignificant: the different formulations are mere variations of the overarching reasonableness standard. With regard to the prejudice inquiry, only
the strict outcome-determinative test, among the standards
articulated in the lower courts, imposes a heavier burden on
defendants than the tests laid down today. The difference,
however, should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness claim
only in the rarest case.
Although we have discussed the performance component of
an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component,
there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even
to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant
makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court
need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance.
If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will
often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should
strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so
burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.
The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should
apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct
appeal or in motions for a new trial. As indicated by the
"cause and prejudice" test for overcoming procedural waivers
of claims of error, the presumption that a criminal judgment
is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that judgment. See United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 162-169
(1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126--129 (1982). An in-
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effectiveness claim, however, as our articulation of the standards that govern decision of such claims makes clear, is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose
result is challenged. Since fundamental fairness is the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus, see id., at 126, no
special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims
made in habeas proceedings.
Finally, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal
judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court to the extent stated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Ineffectiveness is not a question of"basic, primary, or historical
fact[]," Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 309, n. 6 (1963).
Rather, like the question whether multiple representation in
a particular case gave rise to a conflict of interest, it is a
mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U. S., at 342. Although state court findings of fact made in
the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to
. the deference requirement of§ 2254(d), and although District
Court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard
of Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 52(a), both the performance and
prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are
mixed questions of law and fact.

v

Having articulated general standards for judging ineffectiveness claims, we think it useful to apply those standards to
the facts of this case in order to illustrate the meaning of the
general principles. The record makes it possible to do so.
There are no conflicts between the state and federal courts
over findings of fact, and the principles we have articulated
are sufficiently close to the principles applied both in the
Florida courts and in the District Court that it is clear that
the factfinding was not affected by erroneous legal principles.
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 291-292
(1982).
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Application of the principles is not difficult in this case.
The facts as described above, see supra, at - - - - - ,
make clear that the conduct of respondent's counsel at and
before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be found
unreasonable. They also make clear that, even assuming the
challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, respondent
suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his
death sentence.
With respect to the performance component, the record
shows that respondent's counsel made a strategic choice to
argue for the extreme emotional distress mitigating circumstance and to rely as fully as possible on respondent's acceptance of responsibility for his crimes. This decision was well
within the range of professionally reasonable judgments, and
\the decision not to seek more character or psychological evidence than was already in hand was likewise reasonable.
The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to
one's crimes were well known to counsel. The aggravating
circumstances were utterly overwhelming. Trial counsel
could reasonably surmise from his conversations with respondent that character and psychological evidence would be
of little help. Respondent had already been able to mention
at the plea colloquy the substance of what there was to know
about his financial and emotional troubles. Restricting testimony on respondent's character to what had come in at the
plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and psychological evidence and respondent's criminal history, which counsel
had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. On
these facts, there can be little question, even without application of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial
counsel's defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of reasonable professional judgment.
With respect to the prejudice component, the inadequacy
of respondent's claim is even more stark. The evidence that
respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the
sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing
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profile presented to the sentencing judge. As the state
courts and District Court found, at most this evidence shows
that numerous people who knew respondent thought he was
generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and a psychologist believed he was under considerable emotional
stress that did not rise to the level of extreme disturbance.
Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have
changed the sentencing decision of the judge who, on the
record he had before him, concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and
sentenced respondent to death. Indeed, admission of the evidence respondent now offers might even have been harmful
to his case: his "rap sheet" would probably have been admitted into evidence, and the psychological reports would have
directly contradicted respondent's claim that the mitigating
circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance applied to his
case.
Our conclusions on both the prejudice and performance
components of the ineffectiveness inquiry do not depend on
the trial judge's testimony at the District Court hearing.
We therefore need not consider the admissibility of that testimony. Moreover, the prejudice question is resolvable, and
hence the ineffectiveness claim can be rejected, without regard to the evidence presented at the District Court hearing.
The state courts properly concluded that the ineffectiveness
claim was meritless without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Failure to make the required showing of either deficient
performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Here there is a double failure. More generally,
respondent has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance.
Respondent's sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally
unfair.
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We conclude, therefore, that the District Court properly
declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
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March 13, 1984

Re:

Strickland v. Washington, No. 82-1554

Dear Sandra:
I agree with most of the legal analysis in your
careful and scholarly opinion, but I still agree with the
view that prevailed at Conference that we should vacate
and remand rather than reverse outright. I am the ref ore
troubled by Part V of your opinion.
Applying the "performance" component, you write that
"the record shows that respondent's counsel made a
strategic
choice"
not
to
investigate
potentially
mitigating circumstances.
Op. at 28.
I certainly agree
that this might have been the case, but I am not sure we
are free to make such a factual finding for ourselves.
The District Court found: "It is evident that in the
instant case, Mr. Tunkey' s judgment was affected by the
evidence of Washington's guilt and his desire to plead
gui 1 ty.
Mr. Tun key candidly admitted that once the
multiple confessions were given, he had a feeling that
nothing could be done to save Washington and that this
feeling was behind his failure to do an independent
investigation
into
petitioner's
background
and
potentially mitigating emotional and mental reasons for
the killings." App. to Pet. for Cert. A282.
As I read this passage, it suggests at least a
strong possibility that Tun key's . decision was not the
product of a strategy, but rather of a sense of
hopelessness.
I do oot consider it "reasonable" for
counsel in a death case to make decisions based on a
feeling of hopelessness and frustration.
Indeed, it
seems to me that the worse the client's plight, the more
important it is that his lawyer acts professionally and

not on the basis of emotion. It is true that there are
other passages in the District Court's opinion indicating
that T unkey did act on the bas is of strategy.
That
opinion is, however, ambiguous and the courts below did
not, of course, have before them the standards we are
announcing in this case. I think it is hazardous for us
to try to apply the new standards to a cold record and
determine for ourselves the real basis for Tun key's
decisions.
Instead, · I believe we should remand for
application of the new standards to the facts of this
case.
As to the "prejudice" component of the ineffective
assistance standards,
the District Court's findings
cannot be used to justify a reversal because, as the
Court of Appeals explained, the District Court did not
employ the Agurs standard in analyzing prejudice and it
improperly
relied
on
Judge
Fuller's
testimony.
Accordingly, your opinion engages in its own assessment
of the facts, and concludes that none of the evidence
Tunkey could have adduced rose to the level of "extreme
emotional disturbance." Whether any such evidence could
have satisfied the statutory mitigating factor
is,
however, a question of Florida law we are not competent
to resolve.
Moreover, even if that factor would not have been
satisfied, the Constitution requires that all nonstatutory mitigating factors must be considered as well.
The extreme pressure on Washington that he claims
resulted from his inability to support his family,
although perhaps not amounting to "extreme emotional
distress" under Florida law, could well meet the test of
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 u.s. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting
Lockett v. Oh1o, 438 u.s. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality
op1nion)).
The sentencing judge had oo explanation for
Washington's extraordinary conduct before him, nor was
there any testimony fran persons who knew the defendant
before his crime spree and who could explain what kind of

person he was. All the sentencing judge had, as a result
of Tun key's decision not to investigate further, was
Washington's "apology."
The fact that the sentencing
judge had virtually no information concerning Washington
the man creates, in my judgment, a reasonable doubt about
the outcome that would not otherwise exist--or, to
paraphrase your opinion, undermines my confidence in the
outcome.
Although it seems unlikely that the evidence will
ultimately suffice to satisfy the standards laid out in
your opinion, I am not so convinced of that fact that I
think we should make the necessary findings of fact
ourselves on a cold record, especially in the context of
a death case.
I am also convinced that a remand for
application of the new standard to the facts by the
appropriate factfinder would better indicate to the lower
courts that in addressing these claims they should employ
the care and thoroughness that your opinion demands.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Bill,
Thank you for your quick response in this case. Part V of
the draft was included because it seems to me to be not only
possible but helpful to apply the standards announced in the
opinion to the facts of the case.
It is helpful because it gives a concrete illustration of how
the otherwise abstract principles articulated in the opinion
apply to one particular set of facts. That is both useful to
lower courts and common, though not mandatory, practice for this
Court. It is possible to apply the principles in this case, as
the opinion notes at page 27, because the standards announced in
the opinion are close enough to those applied by the state courts
and District Court that no errors of law can be said to have
infected their factfinding- and because their factfinding provides
a complete record on which to assess adequacy of performance and
prejudice. The performance and prejudice inquiries are mixed
questions of law and fact, moreover, so we may answer them even
though the lower factfinding courts have not applied precisely
the standards articulated in the circulating opinion.
In particular, with respect to the performance inquiry, the
opinion acknowledges that trial counsel's sense of hopelessness
affected his judgment, but that hardly renders his performance
unprofessional. If it did, any counsel who felt hopeless about a
case would have to be disqualified. Surely overconfidence is no
prerequisite to adequate performance. The question is not how
counsel feels but what counsel does, and the record here makes
clear that respondent's counsel made professional decisions.
With respect to the prejudice inquiry, application of the
standards is likewise warranted. You suggest that it is a
question of Florida law whether the statutory mitigating
circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance could be found
present on the proffered evidence; if that is so, the matter is
foreclosed by the Florida courts' negative answer to that
question in this case. In any event, respondent argues only that
counsel failed to investigate nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances. Concerning such circumstances, the circulating
opinion acknowledges that, as you say, the affidavit evidence
might well have counted in favor of respondent by portraying him
as a basically good person. But given the overwhelming

aggravating circumstances, I believe there is no reasonable
probability--unless any favorable evidence at all is enough to
upset confidence in the result--that submission of this fairly
weak affidavit evidence would have made any difference in the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances by Judge
Fuller. This conclusion, as the opinion points out, does not
depend at all on Judge Fuller's testimony.
Naturally, if there are not five of us who are willing to
apply the principles enunciated to the facts, I will revise the
draft to provide for a remand.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
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Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
I think that without Section V, in which
you apply the standards developed in the earlier part of the
opinion to the facts of this case, the opinion is somewhat abstract
and might mean a number of things to a nUmBer of people.
I think
the lower courts will get a far better idea of what the opinion
means if we ourselves apply it to the facts of this case.
Therefore, I hope you decide to retain Section V.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference
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82-1554 - Strickland, Supt. v. Washington
Dear Sandra:
I join. I see no need to remand. I may have a
thought or two later on, but you may show me as joining.
Regards,

Justice O'Connor
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.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

82-1554 - Strickland v. Washington

Dear Sandra,
Join me, please.
Sincerely yours,

Justice O'Connor
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..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 22, 1984

Re:

82-1554 - Strickland v. Washington

Dear Sandra:
As I have told you, I think you have written an
excellent opinion. The only reason I have not joined
you is that I am still inclined to believe that we
should adhere to the position taken by the majority at
conference and remand for application of the standard
set forth in your opinion. Whichever disposition the
majority favors, I would hope your opinion could be
unanimous.
Respectfully,
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Justice O'Connor
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Re: No. 82-1554 - Strickland v. Washington
Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~~

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference
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March 28, 1984

Re:

82-1554 - Strickland v. Washington

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice O'Connor
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